A critical analysis of "Consultation Draft of the Safeguard Policy Statement" of Asian Development Bank
In
October 2007, Asian Development Bank released its “Consultation Draft of the
Safeguard Policy Statement” and held “Indigenous Peoples’ Consultation” in
ADB’s Consultation Draft of the Safeguard Policy Statement in
general and its “Safeguard Requirements for Borrowers/Clients on Indigenous
Peoples” (hereinafter referred as “Indigenous Peoples Safeguards”) in
particular are deeply flawed. A cursory
reading of the Indigenous Peoples Safeguards shows that the ADB places
excessive trust on the borrowers/clients at the cost of the fundamental rights
of the indigenous peoples.
I. General concerns
a. Lack of borrower’s
obligations under international law
The
Asian Development Bank has virtually kept the borrowers/clients outside the
purview of the international laws. They do not have any obligation under
international law. The ADB has overlooked various mechanisms and polices on
indigenous peoples approved by the United Nations including the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
b. No responsibility for the
ADB
The
ADB has also shunned its responsibilities under international law towards the
indigenous peoples once the projects are awarded to the borrowers/clients. The
draft policy states that the ADB shall take legal remedies including suspension
or cancellation of the project if “a borrower/client fails to comply with legal
agreements on safeguard requirements”.
The
problem is that the indigenous peoples have no say in the implementation of the
projects. The indigenous peoples should be made “full or at least proforma party” in the legal agreements between the Bank
and the borrower/client so that the Asian Development Bank is directly
responsible for the safeguards of the interests of the indigenous peoples and
the indigenous peoples as stakeholders can exercise their powers to act in the
event of failure on the part of the borrower/client to comply with ADB’s policy.
c. No clarity about the timing
for applicability of the policy
The ADB’s Indigenous Peoples Safeguards fail to clarify
the trigger timing. Specifically, whether the applicability
of the “safeguard requirements” shall start prior to or after the signing of
the agreement with the borrower/client remains unclear. AITPN suggested
that the safeguard requirements should apply from the moment dialogue with the
borrower is held (i.e. prior to the screening of a project) and the
responsibility to ensure compliance shall form part of the MOU or Contract.
d. Reject ADB’s “Country Safeguard System”
The
ADB lays strong emphasis, rather over-emphasis, on the Country Safeguard
Systems which is defined as a “mean a
country’s legal and institutional framework, consisting of its national,
sub-national, or sectoral implementing institutions
and relevant laws, regulations, rules, and procedures, which pertain to the
policy areas of environmental and social safeguards”. It is well known that
across
In
this regard, AITPN suggested that Country Safeguard System should be done away
with and ADB should develop its own system based on international obligations
of the borrowers/ the State parties.
II. Specific concerns with the
“safeguard requirements on indigenous peoples”
a. Consultation is not consent
The
ADB only recognizes “Free, Prior and Informed Consultation and Broad Community Support”.
But “consultation” is not “consent” and this is an attempt to undermine
established international law. Article 10 of the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples recognizes the “the right to free, prior and informed
consent”.
The
non-recognition of the right to “consent” denies the right to say “no” to any
project which adversely affects indigenous peoples. Therefore, the draft
safeguard requirements do not provide any provision for
abandonment/cancellation of any project before its commencement.
Under
Section 11, the ADB states, “When the borrower/client and the affected
Indigenous Peoples have serious differences and disagreements on the project,
its components, or IPP, the borrower/ client should adopt good faith
negotiations for them to resolve such differences and disagreements”.
Therefore, the intention is clear: by hook or crook, continue with the project.
This is indeed contrary to the ADB’s proposed
accountability mechanism which states “ADB may exercise legal remedies including
suspension, cancellation, or acceleration of maturity” for failure of
compliance. If the project is opposed from the beginning by indigenous peoples
why would the ADB wait till it has to resort to extreme measures? Or is it a
case the ADB believes that accountability shall be an exception.
b. Screening of project:
Borrower the judge and jury
The
screening of the project will be conducted by the borrower/client with the help
of qualified experts. Many countries still do not recognize the indigenous peoples
in their countries.
Hence, without any guidelines in place as to how to choose the qualified
experts, the socalled experts will simply act as
cronies to the borrower. In order to prevent the borrower from becoming both
the judge and the jury, the ADB should conduct the screening with the help of
indigenous experts.
c. No representation of
indigenous peoples for Social Impact Assessment
The
present draft provides that “When screening confirms likely impacts on
Indigenous Peoples, the borrower/client will retain qualified and experienced
expert(s) to carry out a full social impact assessment, and if adverse impacts
on Indigenous Peoples are identified, prepare an IPP [Indigenous Peoples
Planning] in conjunction with the feasibility study”.
But
the indigenous peoples have been totally left out of the Social Impact
Assessment study, which is so crucial if the factual adverse impacts of the
project on the indigenous peoples are to be presented. While indigenous experts
must be mandatorily included in the SIA team, it is
also essential that the ADB must be equally responsible for the Social
Assessment. The SIA study must be made public.
d. Indigenous Peoples Planning
The
preparation of the Indigenous Peoples Plan is as crucial as the Social Impact
Assessment and hence the inclusion of the indigenous peoples must be made
mandatory which is not the case at present. Another matter of serious concern
is that the draft requirements do not provide answers as to under what
circumstances a project can be rejected at any stage. The requirements assert
unequivocally that a project must continue whatever be the adverse impacts on
the indigenous peoples. This is quite frightening considering that the ADB does
not include projects which “promotes racism” in its list of prohibited
investment activities.
e. Information disclosure
This
provision also provides excessive control to the borrower relating to
indigenous peoples. In fact, it provides that “(i)
draft IPP/Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF) endorsed by the
borrower/client, before appraisal.”
Since
the borrower under the current text is mandated to conduct the SIA and prepare
Indigenous Peoples Plan, the suggestion that the draft IPP too will be endorsed
by the borrower is ridiculous and self-serving. In an age of the right to
information, the procedure for information disclosure is quite outdated.
Instead
of the borrower, the ADB should take the responsibility to disclose all the
information to the public and disclosing all information in all stages must
form a part of the agreement signed with the borrower.
f. Grievance mechanism
The
present draft on Indigenous Peoples Safeguards provides for the creation of a
grievance mechanism by the borrower against itself. In a way, the borrower is
being asked to act as judge and jury on itself! It is
a case of too much “good faith on the borrower/client”. It violates
internationally accepted principles on independence and impartiality on any
grievance mechanism.
In
this regard, AITPN recommended that the ADB should establish its own grievance
mechanism consistent with internationally accepted principles on independence
and impartiality on any grievance mechanism.
g. Monitoring and reporting
The
draft Indigenous Peoples Safeguards provides that monitoring and reporting on
the implementation of the IPP is to be done by the borrower. It also suggests
that borrower hire external experts. It is clear that borrowers are not
interested in developing safeguard policies on indigenous peoples. The ADB
should develop independent monitoring mechanism for implementation of the IPP
with the full participation of indigenous peoples’ experts.
h. Project completion
It
is strange that borrower is also given the responsibility to conduct assessment
of implementation of the IPP and the degree of compliance with indigenous
peoples related loan covenants. The ABD must conduct the study itself, among
others, for the lessons learnt for future operations involving indigenous
peoples.
i.
Special considerations: No land rights for indigenous peoples
The
Asian Development Bank uses the ancestral domains, land and related natural
resources to mislead. The critical issue is not ADB’s promises to take measures to recognize land rights as provided under para 45 and para 46 under Special
Considerations. These provisions assume that indigenous peoples do not have any
land rights.
The
critical issue is where indigenous peoples have their land rights recognized
under normal laws or specific laws such as the 5th and 6th Schedules of the
Constitution of India which guarantee land for land as compensation. Even in
these cases, the ADB under para 47 proposes
“resettlement” of the indigenous peoples without making any reference as to how
indigenous peoples’ lands will be acquired. Obviously, the land acquisition
laws shall be applied, and the ADB support acquisition of the lands of
indigenous peoples irrespective of the legal and constitutional guarantees
through the creation of socalled “culturally
appropriate livelihood restoration measures” which are just jargons, never used
by any borrower or Bank. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights under its General Comments No. 7 relating to “the right to
adequate housing: forced evictions” concluded that forced evictions are prima
facie incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant (ICESCR) and laid the
legal guidelines that must be respected by the borrower and the ADB.
The
ADB also does not use rights based approaches with regard to commercial
development of natural and cultural resources (para 48 and 49) as provided under International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, UN Convention on Biological Diversity etc.
In
fact, under Para 50 relating to physical relocation of indigenous peoples, the
ADB gives the discretion to the borrower either to explore alternate project
designs or carry out physical relocation of indigenous peoples without
recognizing the rights of the indigenous peoples under national law or
obligation of the borrowers under international law. The use of the terms
“where possible” is nothing but providing the license to “relocate”. Moreover,
the word “relocate” denotes the necessity to resort to such a measure which in
reality is forced and therefore involves “arbitrariness and of illegality”.
It
is not the borrower but the lender i.e. the ADB which must ensure that there is
no force involved.
Even
under para 51 relating to restriction of access to
protected areas and natural resources, there is no reference to the safeguards
relating to indigenous peoples as provided under the declaration of the World
Parks Congress (Durban 2004) and article 28 of the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Most
surprisingly, the prohibited investment activity of Asian Development Bank does
not include project or investment activities, which are prima facie racist or
involve violations of the right to life. In fact, any violation of the right to
life in the conflicts involving the ADB supported projects must be the threshold
for the “suspension and cancellation” of the projects.


